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SYMPOSIUM:

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS IN
PENNSYLVANIA -

CURRENT

ISSUES
Thoughts on Pennsylvania Administrative Law
Sheldon H. Nahmod*
As a student of administrative law, I have observed that federal
administrative law has received much more classroom and scholarly
attention than state administrative law. This stems in part from the
nature of the subject in the federal and state systems. In the former,
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act' at least gives the impression there is a learnable coherent body of procedural law involving
federal agencies. In contrast, many states until recently had no such
body of procedural law in statutory form. Frequently a given state's
administrative law would be largely found in case law.2
* A.B., University of Chicago; LL.B., LL.M., Harvard Law School; Teaching Fellow, Harvard Law School 1969-71; Professor of Law, Duquesne Law School; Visiting Professor of Law,
Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law 1977-78.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970).
2. Indeed, the famous Benjamin report on New York's administrative procedure concluded that "a general procedural code, in the interest of uniformity," is neither feasible nor
desirable because "much of the existing diversity" in agency procedures "exists for reasons

that are not merely yalid but inescapable." 1 R.

BENJAMIN, ADMINIsTRATWE ADJUDICATION IN
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 35-36 (1942). A similar conclusion was reached by the majority of

the United States Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. See Report
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedures, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 191-92 (1941). This view did not prevail in the federal system once the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act was enacted and it no longer prevails in the majority
of the states.
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This concentration on federal administrative law is also reflected
in casebooks used in law schools. Virtually all administrative law
casebooks pay only minimal attention to state administrative law.
In addition, time constraints in the classroom usually result in ignoring the subject. In all fairness, though, many of the issues discussed in a course devoted to federal administrative law arise when
one studies a particular state's administrative procedure.
Still, continued slighting of state administrative law is unfortunate. First, it may well be that apparently similar problems should
be resolved differently in the states than they have been in the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The federal learning
may not be as freely transferable as has often been supposed because the Federal APA is the result of both careful study of federal
agencies and political compromise. Second, most lawyers will have
more frequent contact with state agencies than with federal agencies. Indeed, in the last few years, state agencies have grown tremendously and now affect virtually every aspect of a person's life. The
average lawyer therefore needs to know much more about his or her
state's administrative procedures. Finally, many states-perhaps as
many as 30 or 35-currently have comprehensive administrative
procedure acts worthy of examination. These acts, most of which are
modeled, at least in part, on the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act,3 cover agency rulemaking, adjudication, judicial
review, and public access.
Scholars have begun lately to turn their attention to state administrative law. Thoughtful analyses of recently enacted or amended
state administrative procedure acts now appear in law reviews with
increasing frequency.4 At the same time, draftsmen responsible for
state legislation have more imaginatively dealt with the problem
of agency accountability. The public has not only been given greater
access to administrative decisions through publication, codification
and "sunshine laws," but it has also been afforded increased opportunities to participate in agency decision-making. This is apparent
3. See 9c UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 134-61 (Cum. Supp. 1967).
4. E.g., Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction,
Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. REV. 731
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield]; Hamilton & Jewett, The Administrative Procedure
and Texas Register Act: Contested Cases and Judicial Review, 54 TEx. L. REV. 285 (1976);
Levinson, The Florida Administrative ProcedureAct: 1974 Revision and 1975 Amendments,
29 U. MAMI L. REV. 617 (1975).
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in statutes like Pennsylvania's Open Meeting Law,5 which provides
for notice and public scrutiny of an agency's formal action, and the
Commonwealth Documents Law,' which provides for notice and
public comment in connection with proposed rulemaking.
In addition, some states have even gone so far as to establish by
statute legislative oversight over agency rulemaking.7 Apart from
the question of feasibility, this technique, in principle, has much to
commend it because agencies, often with much broadly delegated
power, should properly be held accountable to their creator, the
legislature. Judicial reluctance to void regulatory schemes under the
delegation doctrine also makes legislative oversight important. Finally it reflects a concern spotlighted so well by Professor Davis:
because of the significant impact of agency regulations which have
the force and effect of law there is the need to structure, confine and
check agency discretion.'
Pennsylvania's Administrative Agency Law9 also reflects some of
this movement in the states but it has had a checkered history. Its
focus was originally, and for the most part continues to be, on adjudication procedure and judicial review of adjudication.10 It is only
in the last decade that Pennsylvania, through the Commonwealth
Documents Law, has finally dealt comprehensively with rulemaking, notice, and public participation therein, and the publication
and codification of agency regulations in the Pennsylvania Code and
Pennsylvania Bulletin.
Another problem-unreviewable agency action-recently has also
been partially resolved. Previously, judicial review under the Administrative Agency Law was available only where the applicable
agency statute neither permitted nor precluded an appeal. Now,
however, where the applicable statute purports to make an agency's
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261-269 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). Every state now has some
kind of "sunshine law." Compare id. §§ 66.1-.4 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978) ("right to know"
statute).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 1101-1611 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.545 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-535 (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
8. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713 (1969).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.1-.51 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1977-1978). Pennsylvania's
Local Agency Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11302-11311 (Purdon 1972), to some extent
tracks the AAL, but my discussion covers only the AAL.
10. The AAL adheres to the traditional distinction between an "adjudication" and a
"regulation" which is not always clear cut. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759
(1969). However, it suffices for most purposes.
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adjudications final and unreviewable, or where the statute is silent
on the question, a person "aggrieved" with a "direct interest" may
still appeal under the AAL."1 Finally, while relatively few agencies
were initially covered by the AAL, perhaps because of fear of the
unknown or a reluctance to change the status quo, more and more
state agencies have been brought under its coverage, although there
are several notable exceptions, including the Public Utility Commission and Milk Marketing Board."2
There still remain areas for thoughtful change, in addition to
those suggested by the other articles in this issue of the Duquesne
Law Review. The AAL lacks a statutory declaratory judgment procedure for citizen challenges to regulations. Thus, regulations can
be judicially tested only when they are applied to an individual in
the course of an adjudicatory proceeding. 3 While to some extent
"running the gauntlet" can be alleviated by the use of an injunction,
this kind of equitable relief may not always be available.
A continuing and related difficulty is the lack of an AAL provision
authorizing agencies to issue declaratory rulings in order to clarify
their decisions and remove uncertainty. Both the Federal APA and
the Revised Model State APA provide for such rulings. Another area
left open by the AAL is informal agency action. Often important
decisions which significantly affect given individuals take neither
the form of rulemaking nor of adjudication. 5 This kind of informal
agency action should be brought into the open and subjected to
public and legislative scrutiny, but the AAL is silent on the issue.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, agency accountability is of serious concern because of broad delegations of power to agencies. One
11. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.47 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
12. Id. § 1710.51. For a discussion of judicial review under the AAL and the PUC, however,
see Streiff, Procedures Before the Public Utility Commission, 15 DuQ. L. Rav. 645, 648, 66568 (1977).
13. For a different approach, see Byse, Administrative Procedure Reform in
Pennsylvania, 97 U. PA. L. Rav. 22, 37-39 (1948). See also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967). In contrast, the Commonwealth Documents Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1205
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978), provides that an agency may appeal to commonwealth court from
an adverse determination of the Department of Justice as to the legality of administrative
regulations.
14. Reader, Judicial Review of "Final" Administrative Decisions in Pennsylvania, 67
DICK. L. REv. 1, 23-26 (1962). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.42 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
15. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (scope
of review of, and requirement of findings for, informal agency action under APA). On prosecutorial discretion, a special kind of informal agency action, see generally DAvis, DIScagRIONAav
JUSTICE

(1969).
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way of attempting to ensure accountability is through formalized
legislative oversight in connection with the promulgation of agency
regulations. While some states have enacted legislation subjecting
agency regulations to formal legislative scrutiny,"6 the AAL and
Commonwealth Documents Law have no such provision. This is not
to say that legislative oversight is either necessary or workable for
all agencies, but some agencies, at least, could be made subject to
such oversight after careful study.
Lest all of this be seen as an argument in favor of scrapping the
AAL and substituting for it legislation modeled after either the
Federal APA or the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure
Act, I want to emphasize that I believe Pennsylvania has properly
proceeded cautiously with the AAL, making changes only where
experience has demonstrated their necessity. Moreover, the broad
terms of the AAL have allowed, indeed required, the courts to play
an important role in fleshing out the AAL. This is a far better
procedure than adopting in toto either the Federal APA or the Revised Model State Act which cannot begin to take into account the
distinctive nature, functions, and needs of Pennsylvania's agencies.
This brings me finally to the increasingly prominent procedural
due process issue. There are two criteria for assessing administrative procedures: the first is workability or efficiency and the second
is fairness. While procedural due process protections are usually
identified with the latter, due process can also function to facilitate
the decision-making process and thus promote workability and
efficiency. As a society we are concerned not only with the individual interests affected by agency action, but also with solving social
problems. Indeed, dealing with these problems is the reason for
the existence of administrative agencies.
For this reason, I wonder about the extent of constitutional intrusion into the administrative process. As most lawyers know, agency
adjudications at the state level have become significantly constitutionalized because of a concern for fairness. 7 Given the abuses
16. See note 7 supra. This approach is discussed thoroughly in Bonfield, supra note 4, at
895-99. There are, of course, other approaches to the problem of accountability, including the
establishment of legislative standing committees, watchdog committees, investigations, and

use of the appointment process. See generally W.

GELHORN

& C. BYSE,

ADMINISTRATEV

LAW

109-27 (6th ed. 1974). Pennsylvania's Open Meeting Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 65, §§ 261-269
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978) also promotes accountability, but directly to the public.
17. Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) with Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In the federal system, §§ 5, 7 and 8 of the
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which prompted many of these decisions, one has to be sympathetic
to those who prevailed on the due process issue. Yet, it is possible
that state agencies are in danger of being put into a due process
strait jacket from which it will be difficult to escape. 8
As with so many areas of constitutional adjudication, legislative
inaction lurks in the background. For example, in Pennsylvania, the
AAL simply sets out the bare bones of adjudication procedure and
says nothing about separation of functions. Thus, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has been forced to step in and constitutionalize the
process." We may, however, be reaching the limits of due process
workability. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has
pulled back somewhat in affording procedural protections in apparent recognition of the costs of due process, which include delay, the
use of scarce resources, rather rigid procedural guidelines, and some
inevitable interference with the ultimate function of the decisionmaker.10 If would have been better had the Pennsylvania legislature or the agencies themselves attempted to deal with the problem
earlier, thereby preserving the flexibility so necessary if adjudication procedures are to be workable and fair.
In this light, the adoption by Pennsylvania in 1971 of a comprehensive set of General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure is a welcome and long overdue step. Such rules take account
of the needs of agencies and the social and individual interests at
stake. Their existence also makes it easier for a lawyer to comprehend the administrative process. This "by-product"'" of the CornAdministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1970), set out in detail procedural
requirements for adjudication.
18. Compare Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975). Expanded
procedural protections may be especially troublesome in the "mass justice" area, id. at
1289-91, where Friendly suggests the use of a so-called "investigatory" system instead of an
adversary one.
Another approach involves rejecting the either-or dilemma in which there must be a fullscale, trial-type hearing or none at all, and adopting instead a more flexible outlook as to what
"process" is "due." See, e.g., Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage
Inv., 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974) (prior notice, right to respond in writing, and statement of
reasons required by due process for tenants in federally subsidized housing in connection with
proposed rent increase; trial-type hearing not required).
19. Compare, e.g., Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1975), and Horn v.
Township of Hillton, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975), with Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
(1975).
20. E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
21. The rules were so characterized in Zeiter, The New General Rules of Administrative
Practiceand Procedureand the Commonwealth Documents Law, 44 PA. B.A.Q. 109 (1972).
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monwealth Documents Law represents a responsible approach to
administrative law.
Conclusion
I do not minimize the necessity of national planning in the areas
of welfare, the environment, energy and the like when I say that
state involvement is essential in order to address these concerns
satisfactorily. Thus, efficient, fair, and responsive administrative
procedures are vital at the state level.
As I have indicated, there has been considerable movement by
Pennsylvania and other states in this direction. If this trend continues, the result will be better solutions to national problems and
a healthier federal system.

